

CONFIDENTIAL  
~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

COPY NO. 14

OCI NO.1052/55

4 February 1955

CD/ED

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL  
~~SECRET~~

25X1

[Redacted]

DOCUMENT NO. 18  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1089 C

AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 2850871  
REVIEWER: [Redacted]

State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

25X1

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/06/21 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 February 1955

This publication ceases in its present form with this issue.

Beginning next week it will be incorporated in a new weekly publication: The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary.

25X1

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON  
Assistant Director,  
Current Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/06/21 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . Page 4

Communist strategy on Formosa issue--inflationary pressures in Eastern Europe.

INDIA SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . . . . . Page 6

India, since the Geneva conference in July 1954, appears to have become increasingly concerned over the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia and as a result is attempting to increase its own influence in the area. Indian advances will appeal in varying degrees to the Southeast Asian government, but Peiping is unlikely to acquiesce in the development of a strong Indian sphere of influence around China's southern periphery.

THE CURRENT BRITISH ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE . Page 8

Britain apparently still considers Egypt the key to the defense of the Middle East, and remains convinced there can be no effective area defense arrangement without direct Western participation.

PAKISTAN'S LEADERS FACE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL STABILITY . . . . . Page 10

Efforts by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and his small ruling group to establish a constitutional framework for government in Pakistan are likely--as in the past--to be interrupted by irresponsible action on the part of dissident politicians. The oligarchy's immediate reaction may be to cease serious efforts to restore constitutional government.

4 Feb 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Page 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

**SECRET**

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY . . . . . Page 13

Turkey's financial situation, both foreign and domestic, has steadily deteriorated during recent months despite good prospects for long-range economic development. The Menderes government appears determined to continue an ambitious program of military and economic development regardless of inflation and heavy foreign indebtedness.

THE FATE OF STALIN'S LAST HIGH COMMAND . . . . . Page 16

The fact that at least half the members of Stalin's 1952 presidium have lost their position on the presidium and are no longer a part of the central administration in Moscow is a reflection of an important disavowal of the Stalinist heritage and of considerable political turbulence during the past two years.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## THE SOVIET WORLD

While Peiping stepped up the pressure on the offshore islands last week, Moscow sought to maintain maneuverability. Through diplomatic channels Moscow moved to obtain UN consideration of Peiping's main charge--American aggression against China--while together with Peiping it opposed limiting discussion to the offshore islands. Both governments hinted that Peiping would eventually attend Security Council discussions. They may consider that by airing Peiping's charges against the United States in the UN they can gauge the degree to which the United States and particularly its major allies are prepared to compromise.

Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Soviet Union, in its activities at the UN, may be trying to provide face-saving cover for Chinese Communist attendance without retracting the position that the Formosa question is an internal affair. It may also hope to provide the Chinese Communists with an international forum and move them one step closer to UN membership.

Behind the present Communist strategy may well lie some difference of interest between the USSR and its ally on this issue. Peiping's desire to seize Formosa has probably brought it to actions that conflict with Moscow's desire to reduce international tension while strengthening the bloc for long-term competition with the West. Moscow has consistently left the Sino-Soviet alliance unmentioned in relation to Formosa. The major Sino-Soviet communiqué of 11 October 1954 enunciating agreement on various areas of Sino-Soviet relations contained no Soviet commitment on Formosa but merely the usual denunciation of American aggression. Khrushchev, speaking in Peiping at that time, carefully avoided anything resembling a commitment of support for China's aim of liberating Formosa, promising only the support of the Soviet "people," not the government. Since then Moscow has given no evidence of a change in its position on Formosa.

Whether or not the Chinese Communist offshore islands campaign was more the result of Peiping's impetuosity than a joint strategy, the importance of the Sino-Soviet alliance to both powers probably now has resulted in a co-ordinated strategy to gain maximum advantage by a combination of diplomatic and military action. The USSR can be expected to deter Communist China from action involving a substantial risk of general or major war in the Far East. Peiping, it seems, will pursue a

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

relatively cautious military policy for the time being--one designed to avoid involvement with American forces--regardless of its attitude toward UN action on a cease-fire.

In Eastern Europe, the general failure of the Satellite economies to meet production targets for consumers' goods since the inauguration of the new course has resulted in increased inflationary pressure. Although consumers' goods have become available in greater quantities during the past 18 months, wage increases, price reductions, and lower taxes have caused a disproportionately rapid advance in purchasing power. Rumors of an impending currency reform have been noted in varying intensity in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and East Germany. Only in East Germany, however, do they appear plausible and even there the regime will have to move cautiously in order to avoid a crushing blow to worker and peasant morale.

In Poland, a recent statement by the first secretary of the United Workers' Party, Boleslaw Bierut, before the third plenum of the party's central committee on 25 January reveals that during 1955 Poland will continue to implement its new course policies and de-emphasize the rapid development of heavy industry. Hungary, on the other hand, while continuing the new course, plans a significant increase in the rate of industrial growth for this year.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## INDIA SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

India, since the Geneva conference in July 1954, appears to have become increasingly concerned over the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia and as a result is attempting to increase its own influence in the area. Indian advances will appeal in varying degrees to the Southeast Asian governments, but Peiping is not likely to acquiesce in the development of a strong Indian sphere of influence around China's southern periphery.

India, which has long tended to assume that Southeast Asia lies within its orbit, had its complacency shaken by the Communist gains at Geneva. Prime Minister Nehru warned Ho Chi Minh last October that the Communists would "run into trouble" if they sought to extend their holdings beyond Vietnam. Nehru's attitude further hardened following his visit to Communist China, during which he was apparently impressed by Chinese unity and strength. An additional factor may have been British influence. London, while encouraging Nehru's ambitions in Southeast Asia, has long sought to induce him to take a more realistic view of Peiping.

Apparently believing that South Vietnam will eventually fall under Chinese domination, New Delhi has reaffirmed the position that Cambodia and Laos are within its sphere of influence by recognizing Cambodia on 13 December and by posting a consul general to Vientiane in Laos on 8 January.

Meanwhile, Indian members of the International Control Commission in both Laos and Cambodia have injected themselves into local politics. In Laos, where the cease-fire agreement calls for a political settlement between the royal government and the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao, the Indians have sought to "bring the two sides together." They are convinced that the Pathet Lao are not really Communists but good nationalists who can be weaned from the Viet Minh. In Cambodia there has been Indian support for Son Ngoc Thanh, a former dissident leader, in his effort to make a political comeback at the expense of the king.

India may see the Afro-Asian conference as an opportunity to promote its leadership among Southeast Asian countries. The American embassy in New Delhi believes that Nehru can be counted on to combat any Chinese Communist effort to dominate the conference, and that he might take the initiative himself. He may press for wide acceptance of the so-called five principles

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of coexistence in the hope that by further committing Peiping to the principle of nonaggression, a powerful moral force will develop which the Chinese will find difficult to ignore.

Responsiveness to Indian leadership varies. Burma and Indonesia are the most favorably inclined. The Cambodian king occasionally displays neutralist tendencies, and the Laotian premier holds views similar to those of the Indian truce officials regarding the Pathet Lao. Both countries, however, as well as South Vietnam, have increasingly turned toward the United States. Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines are the least susceptible to Indian blandishments, although there are elements in each which favor Indian views.

In its effort to cultivate New Delhi, Peiping has been tolerant of India's ambitions since India has not attempted to include military commitments in its program.

China's policy is probably only a temporary expedient, however. Chou En-lai has often indicated that the Communists aim to win control of all Vietnam, to neutralize Laos and Cambodia and to frustrate any Western-supported Southeast Asian alliance.

The Viet Minh, in violation of the Geneva agreement, is continuing to improve its military capabilities with Chinese assistance, is aiding the Pathet Lao to consolidate its control of northern Laos, and is maintaining an active underground in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There are, moreover, numerous indications that Peiping is attempting to expand its influence elsewhere in Southeast Asia, both by diplomacy and subversion, and it may eventually come into conflict with Indian efforts.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## THE CURRENT BRITISH ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

Britain apparently still considers Egypt the key to the defense of the Middle East, and remains convinced there can be no effective area defense arrangement without direct Western participation. Although London has welcomed the recently announced plans of Turkey and Iraq to conclude a pact, it does not expect this agreement to contribute much toward regional defense and is now attempting to prevent any adverse Egyptian action.

The British believe the participation of Egypt in any Middle East defense system is essential, partly because of its location and manpower, but especially because of the Suez base with its workshops and storage depots. Under the Suez agreement concluded with Egypt last summer, Britain retains for seven years the right to reoccupy the base in the event of an external attack on Turkey or any signatory of the Arab League Collective Security Pact. Having achieved this right after three years of difficult negotiations, Britain does not want to jeopardize it by alienating Egypt.

British officials' assessment of the requirements for a regional defense agreement has made them unenthusiastic toward the "northern tier" approach, the first step in which was the Turkish-Pakistani pact concluded in April 1954. London believes that no organization for this area can be effective without direct Western participation. Foreign Secretary Eden has stated, however, that he is equally anxious to encourage "indigenous initiative" in developing regional defense.

Consequently, Iraqi premier Nuri Said's proposal last fall for a modification of the Arab League Collective Security Pact aroused considerable Foreign Office interest because it contemplated the eventual adherence of Britain and the United States.

Britain's existing treaties with Iraq and Jordan also influence its attitude toward a regional defense arrangement. Of particular concern is the treaty with Iraq, which expires in 1957. Britain recognizes that the present treaty cannot simply be renewed, but is anxious to retain the use of the Shaiba and Habbaniya air bases. London had hoped that its minimum requirements in Iraq could be ensured through a multi-lateral regional agreement. It now appears that bilateral

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

discussions will be necessary, since Nuri Said has promised the Iraqi parliament he will submit his proposals for revision to it by March. Revision has apparently not been discussed in detail, but Britain has already informed Nuri that his suggestion of an arrangement similar to the Suez agreement is unsatisfactory, partly because of Iraq's proximity to the Soviet border.

The Anglo-Jordan treaty does not expire until 1968, but sentiment is developing in Jordan favoring revision. There has been increasing criticism of the prime minister for not having secured modification of the treaty during his talks in London last December.

Shortly after Iraq and Turkey announced their agreement on 13 January to conclude a treaty, Foreign Secretary Eden informed the premiers of the two countries that Britain was "most encouraged" by this development. Actually, however, London expects little from the proposed pact because of the lack of roads between the countries, Turkey's NATO commitments and the deficiencies of the Iraqi army. Eden has mentioned to Nuri Said the need for a prompt follow-up to the communiqué announcing the intended agreement and has inquired about Iraq's plans for consulting with the United States and Britain.

Meanwhile Britain has been attempting to dissuade Egypt from any action adverse to the proposed treaty. Stressing the need for serious thought about Middle East defense, the British ambassador in Cairo has expressed Britain's hope that Egypt will press for an early adjournment of the current meeting of Arab prime ministers until more information on the pact is available. Acting on the instructions from London, he has pointed out that Britain realizes there can be no real Middle East defense without Egypt, and that Eden looks forward to discussing defense questions during his mid-February visit to Cairo.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAKISTAN'S LEADERS FACE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING  
POLITICAL STABILITY

Efforts by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and his small ruling group to establish a constitutional framework for government in Pakistan are likely--as in the past--to be interrupted by irresponsible action on the part of dissident politicians. The oligarchy may react by ceasing serious efforts to restore constitutional government.

The governor general's first effort to improve Pakistan's government structure took place in April 1953, when factionalism within the dominant Moslem League party had led to political disorganization and religious rioting in West Pakistan. At that time, Ghulam Mohammad used his essentially viceregal powers to dismiss Prime Minister Nazimuddin and to replace him with the present prime minister, Mohammad Ali.

The governor general was supported by Finance Minister Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza and General Ayub, commander in chief of the army, all of whom had been seriously concerned over the political and economic deterioration and over the Moslem League's failure to provide the leadership expected of it since 1947, when Pakistan became independent.

The governor general and his immediate entourage hoped to remain in the background and to use the prime minister to restore the Moslem League to political leadership. The political bankruptcy of the league continued, however, and its disastrous defeat in the East Pakistani provincial elections of March 1954 led to its virtual demise.

The subsequent revolt of dissident Moslem League leaders at the time of the "constitutional coup" on 21 September finally convinced the governor general of the uselessness of trying to work through the league. This group took open control of the government, Mirza and General Ayub accepting cabinet positions, and maintained only a veneer of constitutionality by keeping Prime Minister Mohammad Ali.

Despite this second disappointment, the group's strong British civil service tradition and its lack of dictatorial aspirations have led it to undertake still another attempt to establish a more or less democratic government.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This time the oligarchy is making no use of the Constituent Assembly dismissed last October. It is writing a new national constitution. It is revising the provincial structure of West Pakistan, uniting four provinces into one, presumably to eliminate opportunities for potential dissidents to establish themselves in local centers of power.

The governor general's group has also formed a "nonparty" cabinet, including opposition leaders H. S. Suhrawardy of the Awami League and A. H. Sarkar of the Krishak Sramik party. Both of these organizations belonged to the United Front which won the elections in East Pakistan in 1954.

The ruling group is faced with a major difficulty, however, in finding reliable individuals to help rebuild the structure of representative government. Since it has apparently abandoned the national Moslem League organization as such, it can count in West Pakistan only on more or less loyal individual league leaders who took no part in the September "coup." Having no support from the Moslem League leaders in East Pakistan, most of whom participated in the September revolt, the ruling group seems to be trying to utilize the opposition United Front organization as the means through which representative government can be restored there. Ghulam Mohammad presumably hoped by appointing two of its leaders to the cabinet to gain United Front support for his program.

The unscrupulous nature and personal ambitions of many of the individuals with whom the oligarchy is forced to deal in both East and West Pakistan are likely to create difficulties, however. Suhrawardy, the most unstable element in the present government, is already denouncing the policies of the government. He may be seeking to build up enough support to force the governor general to buy him off by making him prime minister.

It seems almost certain that because of increasing resoluteness on the part of Suhrawardy and men of his ilk, the ruling group will sooner or later be faced with the problem of disciplining dissident members of the government. Ghulam Mohammad might again try to counter dissidence with political maneuvers, but it seems more likely that his fund of good will would be exhausted. Mirza, who would succeed the governor general as leader of the ruling group if Ghulam Mohammad's precarious health should fail, is a career civil servant and has little patience with politicians.

~~SECRET~~

With the concurrence also of Defense Minister Ayub and senior military and civil service officials, therefore, either Ghulam Mohammad or Mirza would probably adopt blunter tactics than heretofore to keep Pakistan politically and economically alive. This presumably would entail abandonment of present constitutional plans in favor of more frankly authoritarian government, indefinite postponement of the restoration of popular government, and more open reliance on the army as the ultimate political arbiter if necessary.

~~SECRET~~

## THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY

Turkey's financial situation, both foreign and domestic, has steadily deteriorated during recent months despite good prospects for long-range economic development. The Menderes government appears determined to continue an ambitious program of military and economic development regardless of inflation and heavy foreign indebtedness.

Despite growing industrialization, an extensive public works program, and increases in agricultural production, the purchasing power generated by the government's investment and defense programs has outrun the supply of consumers' goods, causing price rises and continuing inflationary pressure (see chart A, p.15). Some factories have been forced to close down because of exhausted inventories and others are operating at 25 percent of capacity.

Mounting foreign trade deficits and a critical shortage of foreign exchange also are seriously injuring Turkey's ability to purchase from abroad essential industrial equipment, raw materials and consumers' goods (see charts B, D, and E, p. 15). The economic stabilization program which was announced last May failed primarily because the government followed an inflationary policy. The value of the Turkish pound has fallen sharply in the free market. (see chart C, p. 15).

In spite of these trends, the budget the Menderes government has submitted to the Grand National Assembly for the fiscal year beginning in March 1955 provides for a 30-percent increase in over-all expenditures and a 44-percent increase in government investment. Much of this increase will have been absorbed by the rise in prices.

The apparent determination to accelerate the pace of economic development is in contradiction to Ankara's assertion that investments would be studiously limited in view of continuing domestic inflationary pressures and the critical foreign payments position. It is significant that 30 percent of the investment expenditures would depend on foreign exchange despite the critical shortage.

Foreign commercial debts are estimated to total approximately \$150,000,000. West European countries have concluded bilateral trade and credit arrangements with Turkey in an attempt to assure the eventual payment of these debts. Medium-term credit estimated to total over \$300,000,000 has been

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

promised to Turkey if the commercial debt problem can be ~~solved~~ solved. Ankara's ability to pay off these debts, and at the same time purchase additional essential imports, is doubtful, however. Menderes unsuccessfully sought a half-billion-dollar loan from the United States government during his visit to Washington last summer and is again making approaches for a substantial American loan.

In the effort to overcome difficulties in obtaining large foreign credits, Ankara is turning to barter agreements with the countries of the Soviet bloc. Exports to the Orbit during the first nine months of 1954 were 62 percent greater than Turkey's total exports to the Orbit in 1953, and they represent 20.5 percent of its total export trade. By mid-December Turkey had accumulated a \$2,500,000 credit balance in trade with the USSR and favorable balances ranging from \$1,000,000 to \$3,000,000 with Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. There are also indications of increased trade with Bulgaria and East Germany. Rumors persist that the USSR has offered credits or loans to Ankara. Despite this commercial trend, however, the political orientation of Turkey toward the West will almost certainly not be affected.

A recent survey of the Turkish financial situation by American officials concluded that a 44-percent devaluation would "assist the government in restoring stability at home and solvency abroad." Menderes apparently regards such a measure as politically unwise; he reasserted in December before a committee of the Grand National Assembly that devaluation "would never be possible." The continuing belief, however, that the currency will eventually be devalued is an important factor in the black market and has become a matter of increasing concern to the Turkish business community.






American officials, mindful of Turkey's strategic location, defense contribution, and the importance of its continued leadership in the Middle East, believe that Turkey's economic problems can and must be coped with. As the government's investment program pays off gradually in terms of finished goods, inflationary pressures should be relieved and some measure of economic stability restored. While acknowledging the inherent dangers and probable ultimate expense for the United States, these officials tend to regard the long-term prospects of the Turkish economy with restrained optimism.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

## ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TURKEY



SECRET

~~SECRET~~

## THE FATE OF STALIN'S LAST HIGH COMMAND

At least half of the 25 full members and 11 candidate members of the party presidium created by Stalin to replace the politburo at the time of the 19th Party Congress have lost their position on the presidium and are no longer a part of the central administration in Moscow (see chart, p. 20). Those who did not die of natural causes were purged, demoted, or transferred to full-time jobs in the provinces. This pattern represents an important disavowal of the Stalinist heritage and reflects the political turbulence of the past two years. It may also indicate that what was once widely interpreted as a Malenkov clique within this group has been dispersed in deference to collective leadership.

Three from the original list--J.V. Stalin, A.Y. Vyshinsky and M.F. Shkiryatov--apparently died from natural causes. Three others have been purged or probably purged: L.P. Beria; V.M. Andrianov, who was mysteriously removed as first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee in November 1953; and the prominent theoretician D.I. Chesnokov, who has not been identified in a position since early 1953.

Two other members have taken significant demotions. S.D. Ignatiev, onetime minister of the MGB and member of the central committee secretariat, is apparently still so closely associated with the ill-fated doctors' plot as to necessitate his remaining, at least temporarily, in the provinces. He is currently the first secretary of the Bashkir party committee. L.G. Melnikov, who also appears to have suffered in the Beria affair, was removed as party boss of the Ukraine in June 1953, and at the same time probably lost his membership on the presidium. He is now ambassador to Rumania.

Still others may have been demoted. D.S. Korotchenko has moved from the top government post in the Ukraine to the largely ceremonial position of chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet presidium. V.V. Kuznetsov, formerly chairman of the all-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, now is a deputy minister of foreign affairs. Five men brought into the presidium as members or candidates in 1952 and added to the central committee secretariat have been removed from both the presidium and secretariat and sent away from Moscow to less desirable jobs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A special case is that of P.K. Ponomarenko. He has given up his post on the secretariat and been sent to work away from the capital, but his retention as a candidate member of the presidium and party chief of Kazakhstan suggests that his demotion, if any, has been slight.

The list ends with a group of three--those removed from the party presidium, but kept in their old job or transferred to a position considered equivalent to that which they held before October 1952. They are O.V. Kuusinen, chairman of the presidium of the Karelo-Finnish Supreme Soviet; N.S. Patolichev, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party; and P.F. Yudin, a party functionary with considerable foreign affairs experience, now serving as Soviet ambassador to China.

Only Deputy Premiers Kosygin, Malyshev and Tevosyan, Party Secretary Suslov, Finance Minister Zverev and Foreign Trade Minister Kabanov were able to retain important positions in Moscow after being removed from the presidium following Stalin's death. Presidium candidate member Shvernik, formerly a full member, also seems not to have suffered, his present job paralleling his place on the old politburo.

The remaining nine members of Stalin's presidium are full members of the present body. All but two of these were members of the politburo. The two new men, M.Z. Saburov and M.G. Pervukhin, are in the select category of having been promoted despite the drastic concentration of power following Stalin's death. The only other original presidium member to be promoted after leaving the presidium is A.M. Puzanov, who is now chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

If, indeed, a Malenkov clique once existed among some of the younger members of the 1952 presidium, it has probably now been so dispersed as to have lost most of its effectiveness. Alleged cronies of Malenkov--Andrianov, Ignatiev, and Ponomarenko--are a case in point. Thus developments since Stalin's death would suggest that either the clique was never an important force, or that it was an element in Malenkov's strength which he no longer needs or has been deprived of.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRET

## THE FATE OF THE 1952 PARTY PRESIDIUM

DEAD	PURGED	DEMOTED	REMOVED FROM CENTRAL ADMIN- ISTRATION	RETAINED AT CENTER
J. V. Stalin A. Y. Vyshinsky M. F. Shkiryatov	L. P. Beria V. M. Andrianov D. I. Chesnokov	S. D. Ignatiev L. G. Melnikov D. S. Korotchenko V. V. Kuznetsov A. B. Aristov L. I. Brezhnev N. G. Ignatov N. A. Mikhailov N. M. Pegov	P. K. Ponomarenko* O. V. Kuusinen N. S. Patllichev P. F. Yudin	N. A. Bulganin* L. M. Kaganovich* N. S. Khrushchev* G. M. Malenkov* A. I. Mikoyan* V. M. Molotov* M. G. Perukhin* M. Z. Saburov* K. E. Voroshilov* N. M. Shvernik* A. N. Kosygin V. A. Malyshев I. F. Tevosyan M. A. Suslov A. G. Zverev I. G. Kabanov A. M. Puzanov

\* Member of present presidium

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000400170001-1